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Feature No. 2日本語版

Hosting Li Qiang, signing with Trump: Thailand's busy week between China and the US

Introduction

Since the reign of King Rama IV, Thailand has moved between the great powers like bamboo bending in the wind. This is often cited as the reason Thailand was the only Southeast Asian country never colonized. This approach later came to be called "bamboo diplomacy" (การทูตแบบไผ่ลู่ลม).

This week, Thailand is feeling winds from China and the US at the same time. Li Qiang came on November 13–15 and exchanged eight documents. On the evening of the 17th, Anutin is due to sign a joint statement on trade with Trump in Manila. What did Thailand settle with China, and what is it trying to settle with the US?

With China: investment, industrial links and security

The issues: linking Chinese EVs with Thai parts, farm exports to China, and security cooperation.

Li Qiang's schedule (November 13–15)

Date What happened
Nov 13 Arrived at Suvarnabhumi Airport by special flight in the afternoon, met by Anutin and Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jianwei. Summit talks at Government House. Witnessed the signing and exchange of the eight documents around 6:30 p.m. State banquet in the evening
Nov 14 Thai–Chinese business roundtable (more than 200 government and business leaders). Met House Speaker Sophon. Audience with the King and Queen at Dusit Palace in the evening
Nov 15 Left for Manila for the ASEAN–China Summit, seen off by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti and the Chinese ambassador

It was the first official visit by a Chinese premier in seven years, a return visit after Anutin's trip to China in July.

The eight documents

Area Content Thai side / Chinese side
Automotive EVs and smart cars, battery production and recycling, technology transfer, standards, supply chains Ministry of Industry / Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
Durian Phytosanitary protocol for fresh durian exports to China Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives / General Administration of Customs
Salak Phytosanitary protocol for fresh salak exports to China (exports of more than 76 million baht a year expected) Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives / General Administration of Customs
Food safety Cooperation framework on the safety of imported and exported food among Belt and Road countries —
Metrology Raising measurement standards and accuracy to reduce discrepancies in trade Ministry of Commerce / State Administration for Market Regulation
Vocational education Curricula, training facilities, exchanges of students, teachers and experts Ministry of Education / Ministry of Education
Security Memorandum to advance cooperation under China's Global Security Initiative Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Consular Exchange of notes on staffing at both countries' consulates-general Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Chinese Embassy in Thailand
  • Thailand's cabinet had approved the eight documents on November 10 (our November 11 issue, in Japanese).
  • The automotive memorandum runs for five years and is not legally binding. A working group will set an annual action plan. Thai media described it as "not yet an investment contract" (naichangmashare).
  • Durian is Thailand's largest farm export to China: about 1.22 million tonnes worth about 139.9 billion baht in January–September 2026.
  • On security, the two sides also confirmed their first "2+2" meeting of foreign and defense ministers, to be held in the first half of next year. The Global Security Initiative is a security concept China launched in 2022, and Thailand has now signed a memorandum with China to advance cooperation under it.

Investment: China is No. 1

  • At the business roundtable on the 14th, Anutin said Chinese companies filed nearly 500 investment applications in January–September 2026, the most of any country and more than a third of all foreign applications.
  • Thailand wants closer ties between Chinese automakers and Thai parts makers, with priority on data centers, semiconductors and AI, and asked Chinese companies to build curricula with Thai universities. It pointed to the BOI's "Thailand FastPass" and a "Super License" bill that would bundle business permits.
  • Li said he wanted to move cooperation "from production to industrial links" and "from bilateral to regional," and urged Chinese companies to localize their management in Thailand.
  • The Thai government also decided to raise the excise tax on imported EVs to 35% from January 2027 (currently 10–15%; MGR Online). That gives Chinese makers more reason to build in Thailand.

What was not decided

  • Anutin again asked China to buy 500,000 tonnes of Thai rice government-to-government. Again, no contract was signed and no price or shipping schedule was given (Thai Examiner).
  • The two sides confirmed the target of opening phase one of the high-speed railway in 2030. For phase two, which would link to China via Laos, there are still no figures on funding or schedule.
  • On river pollution in the north, China floated a joint laboratory, but with no timing or location. On the 16th, a group of senators said arsenic and other toxins in Chiang Rai's rivers exceed standards and urged the government to negotiate directly with China. They noted that the eight documents say nothing about rare earth mining upstream in Myanmar's Shan State (Krungthep Turakij).

As I see it, Thailand's requests came without numbers, while China's priorities were put in writing.

With the US: tariffs and a trade agreement

The issue: how far Thailand can bring down US tariffs on its goods through a reciprocal trade agreement.

The tariff today: 12.5%

  • On February 20, 2026, the US Supreme Court ruled against the earlier "reciprocal tariffs" (19% for Thailand).
  • Since July 24, most Thai goods have faced a 12.5% tariff under a different law, Section 301 of the Trade Act. The stated reason is that Thailand has not banned imports of goods made with forced labor; countries that have a reciprocal trade agreement with the US, among others, pay 10% (Grant Thornton Thailand).
  • The US is also investigating "excess capacity" in Thai electronics, rubber and machinery.

Signing a joint statement in Manila on the evening of the 17th

  • Thailand's cabinet approved the draft joint statement on November 10. Anutin and Trump are set to sign it at 7:30 p.m. Manila time on the 17th, on the sidelines of ASEAN-related summits in Manila.
  • The statement will mark substantial agreement; it is not the final agreement, and its terms, including tariff rates, have not been published. Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Suphajee said legal review before signing the final agreement will take at least one to two months (MGR Online). Anutin said tariffs will not change until the final agreement is signed (THE STANDARD).

The US is Thailand's largest export market

The US share of Thai exports has almost doubled over the past ten years, while China's has stayed at around 11–13% and Japan's has slipped from about 9% to about 7%. China briefly took the top spot in 2017–18, but the US has been No. 1 since 2019, and its lead has grown since.

Year To the US To China (reference) To Japan (reference)
2015 11.2% 11.1% 9.4%
2017 11.3% 12.5% 9.3%
2019 12.8% 11.8% 10.0%
2021 15.5% 13.7% 9.2%
2023 17.0% 12.0% 8.6%
2025 about 21% about 12% about 7%

(Share of total exports. 2015–2023: World Bank WITS; 2025: UN Comtrade)

By the way: Japanese cars are not what drives Thai exports to the US
Thailand's biggest exports to the US are computers and parts (about 28%), telecom equipment (about 8%) and rubber products such as tires (about 6%). Cars and parts rank eighth, at only about 2.6% (2025; calculated from Commerce Ministry figures reported by Dailynews). Thai-built cars go mainly to Australia, Asia and the Middle East (Thansettakij). The US puts a 25% tariff on imported light trucks (known as the "chicken tax"), and Japanese-brand pickups built in Thailand are not sold in the US.

What about imports? Japan was Thailand's No. 1 supplier until 2013. China has led since then, and the gap keeps widening. The US share of imports has stayed at around 6%.

Year From the US From China (reference) From Japan (reference)
2010 5.9% 13.3% 20.8%
2013 5.9% 15.1% 16.4%
2015 6.9% 20.3% 15.4%
2019 7.4% 21.3% 14.1%
2023 6.7% 24.6% 10.8%
2025 about 6% about 31% about 9%

(Share of total imports. 2010–2023: World Bank WITS (2010, 2013, 2023, etc.); 2025: UN Comtrade) In Thailand's fiscal 2026 (October 2025–September 2026), imports from China rose about 34% and the trade deficit with China widened to about 3.1 trillion baht (our November 11 issue, in Japanese).

In my view, the US has become far more important to Thailand as a buyer over the past few years. Signing with Washington in the same week as the eight documents with Beijing is, I believe, about keeping its best customer. Keeping options open with both sides, without settling everything, is classic bamboo diplomacy.

Where the US and China meet: rules of origin

The more factories Chinese investment builds in Thailand, the more closely Washington may watch. The US is wary of Chinese goods and parts entering the US via Southeast Asia (Thai Examiner). How much will count as "made in Thailand" won't be known until the text of the final agreement is out. This is where the EV memorandum with China and the trade agreement with the US could collide.

How Thailand itself sees the US and China

Thai officials and military leaders describe their position between the two powers this way. - Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow (April, interview with a US newspaper; Bangkok Post): He said much of US policy is unpredictable and called China "a more consistent partner." He acknowledged that China, too, behaves like a superpower when its core interests are at stake, but said "we know what those core interests are." And: "It's not about taking sides." - Air Chief Marshal Seksan (October; Khaosod English): "There is no such thing as neutrality, but we must maintain balance." He likened it to having two strong friends: rather than choosing one, Thailand should focus on areas where their interests overlap. Thailand will not become "a tool of any great power." - Associate Professor Nisit (Chiang Mai University, November 8, before the visit; Matichon): The visit should produce concrete agreements, not just show friendship. Its success depends on three things: the quality of investment, including technology transfer; economic security and public safety; and concrete benefits for both sides.

Reference: Thailand's views in numbers
In ISEAS's State of Southeast Asia 2026 survey, when forced to choose between the US and China, Thai respondents picked China 55.0% and the US 45.0%. On trust, Japan scored 69.0%, the EU 55.0%, China 39.8% and the US 39.2%. US analyst Derek Grossman argues that US unpredictability is eroding Thai trust and strengthening China's influence (November 13, China-Global South Project).

My sense is that goodwill and money flows are two different things. Japan is the most trusted, but Thailand sells to the US and buys from China. In Bangkok, I see far more Europeans than Americans. Americans are barely visible on the street, yet the US is Thailand's biggest customer.
*In 2025, visitors from seven European countries (UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands) totaled about 3.92 million, versus about 1.08 million from the US (arrivals by nationality).

Implications for Japanese companies

Note: These are business implications, not investment advice.

1. China: local EV production is being pushed by both documents and taxes. The automotive memorandum is a non-binding framework, but the excise tax on imported EVs rises to 35% in 2027. Chinese makers are likely to build more in Thailand. For Japanese parts makers, Chinese automakers can be both customers and competitors. Japanese suppliers need to decide how they will deal with them.

2. US: the terms for exports to the US are not yet written. The joint statement due on the 17th will mark substantial agreement; neither tariff rates nor rules of origin have been published. Companies exporting from Thailand to the US will need to check the rules of origin against their own parts sourcing once the final text is out, especially if they use many Chinese-made parts.

3. Both: economics and security can no longer be viewed separately. Thailand has signed a security memorandum with China and will hold a 2+2 next year. With the US, too, the October 2025 framework for the trade agreement already included economic and national security cooperation (Thai government). When Japanese companies choose partners and investments, they need to look at which US or Chinese rules and demands might apply.

And Japan? Japan in Thailand, in numbers
  • Japan as an export market: down from about 9% of Thai exports (2015) to about 7% (2025; table above)
  • Japanese working in Thailand (work permits): down about 40%, from a peak of about 37,000 (2015–2017) to about 22,000. Chinese holders tripled from about 19,000 in 2015 to about 56,000 and overtook the Japanese in December 2022 (Thai Department of Employment, November 2025).
  • Japan as a supplier: No. 1 until 2013, now a distant No. 2 behind China (table above).
  • Investment stock: Japan's share fell from about 35% in 2016 to 24.8% at the end of March 2026, when Singapore overtook Japan for the first time (Bank of Thailand data; Nation Thailand).
  • New car market: Japanese brands' share fell from about 90% in 2020 to about 60% in January–September 2026 (our November 4 issue, in Japanese).
  • Investment applications: China is No. 1 this year. Applications from Japan doubled in 2025 but have stalled in 2026 (our November 4 issue).
  • Sentiment: Japan is the partner Thais trust most, at 69.0% (ISEAS, reference above).
On the other hand, the number of Japanese companies in Thailand has actually grown, from 5,444 in 2017 to 6,083 (JETRO, FY2024). The Thai government is also courting Japanese investment: Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti visits Japan on November 18–20 (our November 11 issue, in Japanese).

And Japan? Thais still like Japan. But Japan's share of Thai exports, its rank as a supplier and investor, the number of Japanese working in Thailand, and Japanese brands' share of new car sales have all fallen over the past decade or so. As the US and China grow more present, I see Japan's weight in economics and security declining in relative terms.

This week, Thailand exchanged eight documents with China and is about to sign a joint statement with the US. Both winds will gradually reshape Thai industry. Who will lay the groundwork for what comes next?

Sources